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AIR FORCE ACADEMY ATTRITION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE
ON THE COLLEGE DROPOUT PROBLEM
by Stephen W. Salant and Roy Danchick
The importance of the academy environment to attrition takes on
particular significance because most recent attrition studies
performed by the academies...have concentrated on the
relationship between attrition and the characteristics of the
students who enter. Comparatively little research was directed to
critically examining the effect the the academy environment on
attrition. Because of the importance of the academy environment
to attrition, we see a need to redirect some of the academies'
research so that it is more balanced in scope. There should be
more emphasis on evaluating the impact of the academy environment
on attrition, especially how the environment interacts with the
students' characteristics to cause attrition.
[GAO Report, 1976, p.41]
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this report is to summarize the conceptual
underpinnings and computerized implementation of a model of Air Force
Academy attrition. The policy question which prompted development of
this model concerns the effects of moving the commitment point--the date
after which dropouts are obligated to serve on active duty in an
enlisted status. This date is currently set at the beginning of the
junior year. Prior to that date, a cadet may leave the Academy--having
paid nothing for tuition, room, or board--without incurring any service
obligation or financial penalty.
We began our research by reviewing several surveys of the enormous
literature on student attrition at the college level. There are
actually two distinct but complementary strands to this literature that
have developed somewhat independently: one for civilian schools and the
other for military academies. While the best of the literature provides
very useful information about attrition behavior in an existing
environment, none of it is directly applicable to the policy question we
were asked to examine. For, the literature deals almost exclusively
with the selection question: what will be the effect on attrition of
selecting from a given applicant pool candidates with alternative sets
of entry characteristics. None of it concerns the effects of a change
in the college environment on 1) the behavior of a given set of entrants
or on 2) the composition of the applicant pool from which entrants are
selected.
To study the effects on cadet attrition of any change in the
college environment requires a fundamentally different approach than has
been taken in other studies of student attrition. We hypothesize that
cadet attrition behavior is not random or invariant, but rather is
responsive to the circumstances in which the cadet finds himself. In
particular, we regard the student as behaving in a self-interested
wanner- -albeit in an uncertain environment and one about which he
continues to learn.
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The hypothesis that students behave "as if" in a purposeful manner
may strike some readers as sensible but others as bizarre. Hopefully,
its merits will soon be demonstrated by a statistical test of our
model's predictions. We were unable to procure the requisite Academy
data to estimate our model or to perform such a test ourselves; however,
later in this report we discuss the data needed to estimate the model
and outline the principles of the estimation. Although at this point we
lack the data to estimate all the parameters in our model, whenever
possible we have incorporated data for the class of 1985 at the Air
Force Academy.
The hypothesis of goal-seeking behavior underlies virtually all
microeconomic studies of adults and has been found repeatedly to be
consistent with observed behavior. However, it is reasonable to
question whether such a hypothesis is equally applicable to youths of
college age. Experimental evidence strongly supports this presumption.
Over the last twenty years, a variety of controlled experiments have
been conducted [Plott, 1982; Smith,1982] to test propositions in
microeconomic theory. These experiments invariably use college students
[drawn from California Institute of Technology, University of Arizona,
Pasadena Community College, etc.] as subjects. Very rarely do subjects
in such experiments deviate systematically from self-interested
behavior. It is, of course, possible in principle that these same
students are less purposeful in the conduct of their own lives. But the
experiments also suggest that when the relative payoffs for self-
interested behavior increase, subjects make fewer--not a greater--number
of errors.
The policy simulation model we have built is based on the
hypothesis of self-interested student behavior. If changes in the
student's environment (such as the commitment obligation) make the
previous pattern of behavior less in a cadet's interest than some
alternative pattern of behavior, we expect his behavior will adjust to
whatever best serves his interests in the new environment. The function
of the computer model is to calculate--for each of a heterogeneous group
of students- -the behavior most suitable for the environment specified
and to summarize the predicted effects on attrition, cost, and quality
of graduate.
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The report is divided into two parts. In part one, we provide an
overview of attrition at the Air Force Academy, then summarize several
widely accepted findings of the attrition literature which have
influenced our modeling, then describe our model's structure, and then
turn to illustrative simulations of the effects of policy changes. Two
types of policy changes are illustrated: 1) selection policies which
alter the composition of the entering class but not student incentives
and 2) environmental policies which alter cadet (and applicant)
incentives. Part one concludes with a discussion of how the model can
be estimated. Part two, which is self-contained, describes the main
program and the six subroutines which comprise the computerized
implementation of the model. The report contains two appendices. The
appendix to part one is a historical summary of the service obligations
faced by dropouts from the Class of 1959 onwards. The appendix to part




iI. OVERVIEW OF ATTRITION AT THE AIR FORCE ACADEMY
In this report, the attrition rate is defined as the percentage of
entering cadets who fail to graduate with their class four years later.
By this definition, the attrition rate at the Academy has ranged from a
low of 27.8% for the class of 197G to a high of 46.2% for the class of
1975. The classes of 1966-1985 had an average (entrant-weighted)
attrition rate of 38.8%. The attrition experience of each class is
reported in Chart 1,
Shocking as these numbers may be to the uninitiated, they compare
favorably with the attrition experience of most civilian colleges.
According to If fert [1957], for the nation as a whole, 60% of an
entering class fails to graduate from the average college four years
later. Some of these students do graduate from another school or
graduate later from their college of entry but--for purposes of
comparison with Academy data--it seems appropriate to count these
students as dropouts. Such a procedure may overstate the percentage of
college students who would have attrited if their colleges had severely
discouraged taking a year or more off. But this group constituted only
10% of entrants in Iffert's study. Hence, even if every one of these
students graduated in four years from his college of entry, attrition
rate would still have been 50%. Iffert's findings were subsequently
confirmed by Sumnerskill [1962] in his review of 35 attrition studies
over a forty year period from 1913-1953. According to Summerskill, the
percentage of students lost to a college over a four-year period had not
changed significantly in four decades. The median attrition rate of the
graduating classes in his study was 63* although he noted substantial
variation across schools.
Perhaps a better standard of comparison, however, is the attrition
performance of the other federal service academies. Chart 2 compares
the attrition rates at each of the five service academies for the
classes of 1964-1975. Clearly, the attrition experience of the Air
Force Academy is not an outlier.
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These comparisons are intended to put the Academy's attrition
problem in perspective, not to deny its existence. To determine the
severity of the problem, it is useful to ask (1) if dismissals account
for most attrition; (2) if most attrition occurs before substantial
resources are wasted; and (3) if a disproportionate number of 'poorly
qualified students are among the voluntary dropouts. To the extent that
the Academy attrition had these characteristics, its effects on resource
costs and quality of graduate would generate little basis for concern.
Chart 3 indicates, however, that most attrition is voluntary and
occurs subsequent to pxetraining. In recent years (for the classes of
1982-5), involuntary attrition (mostly academic dismissals) has ranged
from 7.9% to 9.8%. The remaining attrition is voluntary. Typically
only 5-6% of an entering class leaves during Basic Cadet Training (BCT);



























*As of September, 1983.
Moreover, as will be shown
dropouts are highly qualified.
importance of understanding the
attrition at the Academy.
below, a disproportionate share of these
These characteristics suggest the
magnitude, timing, and incidence of
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III. LITERATURE FINDINGS INCORPORATED IN THE MODEL
What variables do past studies indicate are likely to influence Air
Force Academy attrition? According to Astin [1975, p. 4 5 ], who surveyed
40,000 students at 358 nonmilitary institutions in 1968 and then tracked
them longitudinally four years later, "By far the greatest predictive
factor [in dropout proneness] is the student's past academic record and
academic ability." High school grades and aptitude scores (SAT or ACT)
have been shown in countless studies to be associated with low attrition
rates.1
Their influence is clearly evident in Air Force Academy data. The
Academy aggregates various measures of high school performance into a
composite statistic called ACACOMP. Chart 4 indicates the clear
differences in attrition performance for the different ACACOMP groups in
the entering class of 1985. The average attrition rate of cadets with
scores in the highest performance interval is less than half the rate of
those in the lowest ACACOMP interval.2 Given this pronounced
relationship, we distinguish entrants by ACACOMP group in our model.
Attrition is also strongly correlated with performance in college
as measured by cumulative gradepoint average (GPA). Since students who
perform well in high school tend to have higher GPA's in college, this
correlation is to be expected. However, Astin [1976, p.99-100]
investigated whether cumulative GPA exerted an independent influence on
college attrition using linear multiple regression techniques. Chart 5
reports his findings. The higher a student's cumulative GPA, the lower
his attrition rate. Moreover, Astin found that even after high school
performance and other variables observable at entry are controlled for,
the actual attrition for students with high GPAs. is lower than predicted
and the actual attrition for students with low GPAs is higher than
1For a wide variety of references, see Astin [1975, p. 30 or
Pantages and Creedon (1978, p.62].
2 Since a higher percentage of the attrition of cadets with high
ACACOMP scores is voluntary, reductions in voluntary attrition are
likely to raise the mean quality of the graduates.
CLASS OF '85 ATTRITION RATE
ACACOMP X OF ENTRANTS
ACTUAL ATTRITION RATE


















predicted. From this, he concluded:
"The effects of academic performance on attrition cannot be
attributed entirely to differences among students when they
enter college. College grades appear to influence persistence
directly, independent of initial variations in ability and
family background, financial aid and work during college,
freshman residence, and type of institution. (These variables
were included in computing expected investigation by service
dropout rates)."
While we were unable to find any systematic investigation by service
academies of the independent influence of GPA on attrition, the GAO on
attrition, the GAO Report [1976, enclosure B, p.74] cites several
studies suggestive of Astin's conclusions. Given these findings, we
allowed in our model for the possibility that the cumulative GPA of
cadets in each ACACOMP group will have an independent influence on
attrition as they pass through the academy.
A final potential influence on attrition is the accuracy of the
student's expectations about the Academy and the Air Force. These
expectations are presumably formed prior to entry or in the first few
months at the Academy and are likely to be influenced by information
received during recruitment as well as by impressions formed during BCT.
Support for the plausible hypothesis that some cadets are simply
uninformed (or misinformed) about what they are getting into is informal
but persuasive. There is not only the self-selected testimonial of one
dropout [Penthouse Magazine, Oct. 1979, p.119] that, "What the
recruiters say and what actually goes on at the [Air Force] academy are
two entirely different stories...;" there have also been informal
interviews by a trained psychologist of all BCT dropouts of a given
class. If taken at face value, these interviews indicate a surprising
ignorance on the part of some entering cadets about the nature and goals
of the Academy and the military: "Cultural shock-," "didn't understand
the military," "mi-itary not for him, wants to be a doctor," "doesn't
want to be an officer, "religious conflict over
3 Although we expect GPA to exert an influence on attrition
independent of characteristics at entry, the relationship might be
complex since students who do better academically are likely also to
have better outside opportunities if they attrite (and conversely).
EFFECT OF CUMULATIVE GPA IN COLLEGE ON ATTRITION





AVERAGE EXPECTED ACTUAL EXPECTED+
H MEN
3.25-4.00 24 15 - 9
2.75-3.24 32 22 -10
2.25-2.74 39 31 - 7
1.75-2.24 47 69 22
1.25-1.75 53 97 44
LESS THAN 1.25 54 100 45
WHITE WOMEN
3.25-4.00 24 19 - 5
2.75-3,24 28 23 - 6
2.25-2.74 35 34 - 1
1.75-2.24 45 72 27
1.25-1.75 48 92 44
LESS THAN 1.25 42 100 58
BLACKS IN BLACK COLLEGE
3.25-4.00 27 19 - 8
2.75-3.24 28 17 -11
2.25-2.74 38 31 - 7
1.75-2.24 44 67 23
1.25-1.75 60 88 28
LESS THAN 1.25 * ---
BLACKS IN WHITE COLLEGES
3,25-4.00 28 21 - 7
2.75-3.24 42 28 -15
2.25-2.74 45 39 - 6
1,75-2.24 61 72 12
1.25-1.75 66' 96- 30
LESS THAN 1.25 -- * -- *--*
SOURCE: A. ASTIN, PREVENTIN& STUDENTS ERDQM DROPPING QU.
*NUMBER OF STUDENTS TOO SMALL TO COMPUTE RELIABLE ESTIMATES.
+"EXPECTED" AFTER CONTROLLING FOR VARIATIONS IN STUDENT
ABILITY, BACKGROUND, RESIDENCE, FINANCIAL STATUS AS WELL AS















































. war/killing"... [Resignee's Reasons, collected by John Swiney for the
class of 1987]. In recognition that attrition may sometimes occur
because students enter the Academy -with incorrect expectations, we
allowed in our model for the possibility that prior to and shortly after
entry, cadets continue to process information in an attempt to learn
both about the Academy and the military career beyond.
The literature also suggests several policy instruments which the
military can use to influence voluntary attrition. According to the GAO
Report, the enlisted service obligation for attrition after the '
commitment point exerts a distinct influence on sophomore attrition.
The GAO administered a questionnaire to all students (about 13,000) who
were at the five service academies as of May 1974, all those who left
the academies before graduating between July 1970 and May 1974 (about
7,300), and all graduates of the class of 1973 (about 3,000). Charts 6
and 7 from the GAO Report [1976, p.78] contrast the responses of
continuing sophomores to those who attrited just prior to the commitment
point. Strong concern about the service obligation appears to
distinguish the sophomore dropouts from the continuing students.
These GAO findings for service academy cadets are closely related
to what Astin discovered about college students on ROTC scholarships.
Using his linear multiple regression approach, Astin computed the
expected dropout rate for those students in his sample receiving ROTC
benefits. Since ROTC students are a select group, it should not be
surprising that their expected dropout rate was substantially smaller
(one third less) than the expected attrition rate for non-recipients.
Astin then went on, however, to examine the actual dropout rate of
the ROTC scholarship recipients. He found their attrition rate to be
dramatically less than he had predicted on the basis of entry cha-
racteristics and other variables. His results are reported in Chart 8.
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CHART 8
TYPE EXPECTED DROPOUT RATE ACTUAL DROPOUT
OF STUDENT RATE
ROTC SCHOLARSHIP 24% 9%
RECIPIENT
NON-RECIPIENT 37% -
In attempting to explain why the actual ROTC attrition rate was less less
than half what he predicted, Astin [1975, p.66] observed:
Participation in ROTC may represent a commitment that greatly
decreases the chances that the student will leave college. Among
other things, ROTC is contractual: students who receive benefits
normally make a commitment to continue in the program and to
serve on active duty once they finish college.
He might have added that a ROTC scholarship recipient who does drop
out incurs a significant service or--at his option--financial obligation
as specified in the ROTC contract. For example, the AFROTC contract
specifies:
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That as a condition of receiving advanced education as defined in
10 United States code 2005, [I agree]:
To complete the educational requirements specified in this
contract and to serve on active duty for the period specified in
this contract; and
That if I fail to complete the specified educational
requirements, I will serve on active duty for the period
specified in this contract; and
That if I voluntarily or because of misconduct, fail to
complete the period of active duty specified in this contract, I
will reimburse the United States in an amount that bears the same
ratio to the total cost of my advanced education as the unserved
portion of active duty bears to the total period of active duty
that I agreed to serve...
The Applicant understands and agrees that discharge in
bankruptcy under Title 11, United States Code, if less than 5
years after the last day of the specified period of active duty,
will not release Applicant from the obligation to reimburse the
United States as provided in this contract.
Unlike a service academy cadet, a ROTC scholarship recipient incurs
a service obligation--or its financial substitute--from the moment he
receives any Government support.
In reviewing the hard-out policy at the Air Force Academy prior to
August 1970, the GAO Report [1976, p.15-17] provided a final piece of
evidence that voluntary attrition behavior is affected by attrition
penalties. The Superintendent during the period from - to 1970
reportedly made it extremely difficult to resign prior to October of the
freshman year. According to the Report, "Even after October of the
first year, we were told,'resignation was a time-consuming process
involving considerable counseling by psychiatrists, officers, and senior
cadets, and some potential dropouts were thus discouraged." The
consequences of the hardout policy on first-summer attrition are
indicated in Chart 9. Whether this policy reduced voluntary attrition
or simply delayed it, the policy clearly altered cadet attrition
behavior.
AIR FORCE ACADEMY













Given the apparent responsiveness of cadet attrition behavior to
incentives, we allow in our model for the possibility that--when
attrition occurs either before the end of the hardout period or after
the beginning of the commitment period--cadets' payoffs are reduced.
Having reviewed those empirical findings which influenced our
modeling choices, we turn to a description of our model.
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IV. MODEL DESCRIPTION
The cadet attrition model computes the attrition behavior which
self-interested students would adopt in response to any specified
Academy environment and in addition reports statistics summarizing this
behavior. The model consists of two parts: a model of student attrition
behavior and a characterization of Academy selection policy.
A. THE BEHAVIORAL MODEL
The behavioral model calculates the optimal decisions of high
school seniors in each ACACOMP group. Each student must decide:
1) whether to set up an interview with the Academy, 2) whether to apply
given the interview, 3) whether--if accepted and enrolled--to continue
beyond BCT given the additional information acquired during pretraining
and 4) whether to attrite or continue at the end of each semester's
marking period given the current cumulative GPA and outside
alternatives. The first two of these decisions determine the
composition of the applicant pool while the last two determine the
magnitude and timing of voluntary attrition.
Each cadet is regarded as facing a sequential decision problem
under uncertainty. Information acquired at the interview and in the
first months at the Academy is regarded as providing a way to reduce
the uncertainty. As a simplification, it is assumed that this
information-processing activity (modeled here as Bayesian learning) ends
before receipt of the first report card. At that point, uncertainty
about the Academy is resolved but some (possibly reduced) uncertainty
about the match with the Air Force may remain. In what follows, we
first describe the cadet's decision problem and then turn to its
solution. 1
1A comprehensive but elementary exposition of such "Bayesian
decision problems" may be found in Stokey and Zeckhauser (1978,
p.201-54]; a more advanced treatment is located in Raiffa [1970].
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* The Decision Problem
Prior to entry, each high school senior must decide whether to go
to an interview with an Air Force Academy Liaison Officer (LO) and, if
so, whether to apply to the Academy. Subsequent to entry, each cadet
must decide--after BCT and after receipt of each semester's grades--
whether to drop out or whether to continue. The point in time when a
decision must be made is referred to as a "decision point" or "stage."
There are, therefore, eleven stages where binary decisions must be made:
two prior to entry and nine subsequent to entry. Chart 10 depicts this
sequence of decision points. 2
At the time a student must make a decision, certain information
will be available to him. The cadet may want to take this information
intoaccount when comparing the value of attriting at the current stage
to the expected value of continuing to the next stage. Although there
are only eleven decision points in the model, a wide variety of
situations (referred to as "states" or "decision nodes") may occur at
each stage. Hence, there is not merely one potential binary decision to
be made at each of the eleven stages but many--one for each of the
situations which might at that point potentially confront the cadet.
For example, the cadet making an attrition decision after receipt
of his third semester's grades might base his choice on his interview,
his BCT experience, each of his prior report cards, and the best outside
opportunity available at that point. He could certainly observe all of
this information; and some of it would be likely to affect his
comparison of the expected value of attriting at that stage to the
expected value of continuing to the next stage. Suppose when the third
marking period is reached, one of a thousand situations must then
prevail. To fully specify a cadet's behavior at that stage would
require a description of what he would do in each of these thousand
potential situations.
2When the model is estimated a third stage prior to entry should be
added. At this stage, students who have been accepted decide whether or
not to go to the Academy. See p. -.
0 .#4
PRE-ENTRY STUDENT DECISIONS IN MODEL
I 60 TO DIGEST ADMISSIONS/
INTERVIEW? INTERVIEW --- INFO. -- ENTRYI____APPLY?
Chart 10a
POST-ENTRY STUDENT DECISIONS IN MODEL
BASIC DGS INVOLUNTARY CONINUEJ TNVOJUNTARY CONTINUE IlOUTR INVOLUNTARYCADET -tIINFO, ImATTRI[TION Q AFTER ATTRITION 0R m.ASTERIffATRlON"*" ATTRITION OR
TRAINING COTIEJ 1ST GRADES j1ST GRADES? 2ND GRADES 2L5G5AESJ 3RD GRADES GAUTO
Chart l0b
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At least in principle, a student's attrition behavior can be
characterized by a description of whether he would attrite or continue
in each situation which might confront him at each of the eleven stages.
Given any such specification of student behavior, the ultimate
outcome (how, when, and in what state the process terminates) would then
depend entirely on the realized path of situations which arises. The
student is assumed to be able to assess the probability attached to each
path and to assign to each a number or payoff indicating how he values
that path. Any specification of student behavior therefore induces a
probability distribution across the various payoffs. The hypothesis
that each student behaves in a self-interested manner then translates
into the hypothesis that he adopts whatever behavior maximizes his
expected payoff.
The larger the number of potential situations which the cadet might
confront at each stage, the more difficult it is to compute self-
interested behavior. As a practical matter, therefore, a priori
modeling choices are customarily made about the relevance of available
information to the decision at each stage. Distinguishable situations
which nonetheless would likely always result in a common decision are
aggregated together in an attempt to cope with the "curse of
dimensionality." We have assumed, for example, that the cadet's
attrition decision at a given point is based on his cumulative GPA at
that point rather than on a more refined description of his grade
history. Moreover, we have grouped the continuum of possible GPA
averages at any point into seven grade intervals. Finally, we have also
assumed that the student's interview and BCT experiences each resulted
in one of two reactions (positive or negative).
The cadet's decision problem has the following structure. At each
of the eleven stages, the cadet finds himself in one of a finite number
of situations. If he has just been dismissed, he has no choice to make.
If, however, he has not just been dismissed he can choose whether or not
to continue. If he does not continue he receives an expected payoff and
the process terminates. If he does continue, he transits stochastically
to the next stage, where he again finds himself in one of a finite
number of situations... The process terminates in one of three ways:
- 26 -
1) voluntary termination, 2) dismissal, or 3) graduation. Payoffs
depend on which of these three types of termination occurs, its time of
occurrence, and the state at the time of termination.3 The cadet's
decision problem prior to and subsequent to the start of academics is
depicted in Charts 11 and 12.
As Chart 11 indicates, there are three decision points in the model
prior to the start of academics. At these points the prospective cadet
must decide: O)whether to go to an interview, 1)whether to apply, and
2)whether--if admitted--to continue beyond BCT. These decisions are
denoted DZERO, DONE, and DTWO. At the time the application decision
must be made, the cadet has been to the interview and can base his
choice on his impressions. Similarly at the time the cadet must decide
whether to continue on and receive his first report card, he has
information both from his interview and from his BCT experience. There
are, therefore, two potential situations confronting him at the
application stage and four immediately following BCT. Hence, there are
seven potential situations in which he will be called to make a
decision: DZERO, DONE(l), DONE(2), DTWO(l), DTWO(2), DTWO(3),and
DTWO(4). Each of these seven decision nodes is represented in the
decision tree by a square. Following the cadet's decision, the process
transits stochastically to some state at the next stage. That is,
following his decision, some event occurs which the cadet regards as
beyond his control. Such transitions occur at "chance nodes," which are
represented in the decision tree by circles."
The cadet's decision problem after the start of academics is too
complex to depict in its entirety. Instead, Chart 12 depicts the choice
which would confront the cadet at a "representative" decision node.
Since for each of seven marking periods there are seven GPA states
in which a decision is required (the other two GPA categories represent
involuntary dismissals) and since each is characterized by one of four
end-states to the learning process and one of three realizations of a
"transient disturbance" there are 7X7X4X3 = 588 decision nodes of the
3 Since the current GPA at the time of a dismissal is seldom
pomputed, the payoff following a dismissal is assumed to depend on GPA
in the prior marking period.
"This notation is used in most treatments of decision problems.
Decisions About Joining the Applicant Pool and Continuing Beyond BCT




Drop Out DTWO(1) -0
After BCT U - Hardout or Commitment-Point




Dftr Out U - Hardout or Commxitment-Point




Academy .u N=1 3




. Hardout or Commitment-Point
Penalty If Either Is Applicable
TWO(4) -1
Draw 1st Grades
Drop DTWO(4) = 0Drop BCT -HardOUt or Commitment-Point
After BOT U Penalty If Either is Applicable
Chart 11
Voluntary Attrition Decision After Receipt of Grades
(One of the 588 Decision Nodes of This Type)
State of the System:
" Semester =t
" Cumulative GPA = (
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±O G -1G) ifdout or Commitment-Point+ (GPeViaty If Either is Appflcabl6
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Penalty if Either is Applicable-.
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Note: In output. the single column "value of attritlng" is reported assuming f - 0.
To compute the corresponding columns ifs + a (E = - a) add (subtfract) a from each entry.
Chart 12
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type represented in Chart 12.
The idea of a "transient disturbance" term merits discussion. It
is intended to capture those transient events which alter the value of
outside opportunities but which only the cadet observes: changes in
family responsibilities, illnesses, accidents, exceptional job offers,
unprecedented transfer opportunities, and so forth. Although it is
assumed that such shocks are unobserved by the analyst it is still
possible to estimate the common distribution from which they are drawn
by using detailed longitudinal attrition records of individual cadets.
The disturbance distribution is included in simplified form here in
the simulation model merely to illustrate where it enters the cadet's
calculations. Its real use is in estimation. When estimating the
model, it is recommended that this "dummy" distribution be replaced by
one which allows for more realizatio s. As discussed in Section VI,
this requires only a trivial modification which will not increase
computational difficulties.
* Solution to the Decision Problem
To determine optimal behavior given the decision problem sketched
in Charts 11 and 12, information is required about various
Probability Distributions;
-- Commitment and Hardout Policies;
Terminal Payoffs; and,
-- Transition Costs.
Table 1 summarizes the requisite information and introduces the notation
we will use henceforth. The student confronting the sequential decision
problem under discussion is assumed to know all of the information
listed. How the analyst can estimate .parameters he does not know is
discussed in Section VI.
'For a brilliant application of this methodology to a closely
related model, see Gotz and McCall's' [1980, 1984] estimation of their
policy model of Air Force officer retention.
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Given the information, the student can solve the decision problem
as follows. Since he knows that the signals he will observe are
correlated with the satisfaction (in monetary equivalents) he will
ultimately experience if he graduates from the Academy and becomes an
Air Force officer, he will use his observation of the signal pair to
revise his expectation about the psychic reward of such a career.
Denote this conditional expectation as (g(i=1, 4). Since the expected
monetary compensation of a career as an officer is M, for each
possible end-state of the learning process (signal pair i, i = 1, 4), he
expects to receive N + . in total by graduating.' Therefore,
V (G, c) = M+ ..
8 1
In addition, it is assumed that the last voluntary attrition occurs in
January of the senior year.7
Given this "terminal condition," the payoff has been specified for
th endpoints of every branch of the tree reachable from the seventh
marking period. To solve the decision problem, two rules are used
repeatedly, starting in June of the senior year and working backwards.
The rules permit the valuation of chance nodes (represented in the
diagrams by circles) and decision nodes (represented in the diagrams by
squares):
'This simplification that the payoff to graduation is independent
of his overall GPA incorporates what we were told on visits to the
Academy about a "clean slate" policy for graduates.
7While it might have been preferable aesthetically to permit
voluntary attrition in June of the senior year, choosing to leave at
that stage would be suboptimal in all of the policy environments we
considered. Hence as a practical matter, our convention of treating




PA(j), j = 1, 3
PDFk (G), k=1,10; G=1,9
P t(G,G'), t=1,7; G=1,7; G'=1,9
P1
Disturbance probability distribution
In4tial grade distribution for
kth ACACOMP group
Markov probabilities for the
tth transition
Probability of a positive first
signal (at interview)
Probability of a positive second
signal (at BCT) given a positive
first signal (at interview)
P3
Probability of a positive second
signal (at BCT) given a negative
first signal (at interview)
II. COMMITMENT AND HARDOUT POLICIES
jCOM (= 0, 1, ... 9)
jHO ( -1, 0, . .. , jCOM)
TCOM
'HO
The earliest semester when the
commitment obligation applies;
jCOM = 9 means no commit-
meat obligation is in effect
The last semester when the
hardout penalty applies; jHO = -1







if t 2 jCOM




!II. UNDISCOUNTED TERMINAL PAYOFFS
Payoff to high school senior in
the kth ACACOMP group who chooses
the best alternative to the Air
Force Academy.
Payof f to freshman in the kth
ACACOMP group who attrites following
BCT.
Uk - PLTY(O)
Uk - PLTY(1) - X (j = 1,2)
Uk + B(Gt k) -PLTY(t) +cE
Uk + 8(Gt Gk) - PLTY(t + 1) -
X. (j = 1,2)
J
1i+ .
Payoff to freshman in the kth ACACOMP
group who is dismissed for academic
(j = 1) or nonacademic (j = 2)
reasons in January of the freshman
year.
Payoff to cadet in the kth
ACACOMP group who attrites in the
tth semester with GPA G
t
and disturbance Fc; Gk is the
mean initial grade of this ACACOMP
group and 6 is a parameter.
Payoff to cadet in the kth ACACOMP
group who is dismissed for
academic (j = 1) or nonacademic
(j = 2) reasons in the t + 1st
semester.
Payoff to graduation: monetary
reward (M) plus the monetary
equivalent (c,) of the satisfaction
of an Air Force career expected
conditional on signal pair
i (i = 1, 4).
The factor used to discount
payoffs.
IV. TRANSITION COSTS
B (t, G) Psychic reward or cost to cadet of -
one more semester at Academy given
GPA G in marking period t after
signal pair i.
CST The cost of enduring ECT.
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V. OPTIMAL DECISIONS (1 MEANS CONTINUE; 0 MEANS STOP)
DZERO Go to interview
DONE (1) Apply given positive signal at
interview
DONE (2) Apply given negative signal at
interview
DTWO (1) Continue past BCT given two
positive signals
DTWO (2) Continue past BCT given mixed
signals--the negative one at BCT
DTWO (3) Continue past BCT given mixed
signals--the positive one at BCT
DTWO (4) Continue past BCT given two
negative signals
dl (G, c), t = 1, 7; G = 1, 7; Continue past tth marking
E = -a, o, +a period
*
VI. VALUES
V Value of the optimal strategy
discounted to beginning of the
program
Value of reaching first marking
period (discounted to that point)
and proceeding optimally given
signal path i
Vt(G, E) Value of reaching tth marking period
(discounted to that point) and
proceeding'optimally given signal
path i, grade G, and disturbance '
The superscript k (to denote the kh ACACOMP group) should
be attached to each decision and value in the table but has been omitted
to simplify the notation.
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* At each chance node nearest the terminus, compute the
probability-weighted average of the payoffs of its branches.
Enter the computed expected value in the circle on the decision-
tree.
* At each decision node nearest the terminus, pick the'branch
with the larger payoff (net of any transition costs) and enter
its associated net payoff (denoted below as V ) in the square
on the decision-tree.
Raving evaluated these nodes, we are then in a position to repeat
the process at the two types of nodes at the previous stage and so on...
Eventually, the first semester of the freshman year is reached and a
value (V (G, c), for G = 1, 7 and E = -a, o, a) is assigned to each of
the twenty-one decision nodes. The entire process can then be repeated
for the three other signal pairs (i = 1,4).
Since the computer model follows precisely this procedure, we can
use its output to illustrate the process. Consider in Job 298 how a
cadet of quality type 1 on signal path 2 would behave if he reached the
fifth semester with G = 4 and c = 0. The data needed to determine
V2(4, 0) and d2(4, 0) are summarized in Table 2. If the cadet continues,
he pays a transition cost of -5.5 and encounters a chance node. Using
the foregoing rule for valuing chance nodes, it is valued at 12.146. If
the cadet attrites, he receives a payoff of -986.05 (this negative value
reflects the fact that the commitment point has been passed). Since
12.146 - 5.5 > -986.05, the net expected payoff from continuing exceeds
the value of attriting; hence, the cadet would decide to continue:
d5 (4, 0) = 1. Using the foregoing rules, the decision nodes can then be
evaluated V5 (4, 0) = 12.146 - 5.5 = 6.646. These calculations are
summarized in Chart 13.
There are twenty other decision nodes for path two, semester five.
Each is evaluated using the foregoing procedure to obtain d5 (G, c) and
2
V (G, c) for G = 1, 7 and e -a, o, a.
5
Table 2
Voluntary Attrition Decision After Receipt
of Grades: A Numerical Illustration
Source: Job 298, Quality Type 1
State of System:
" Semester = 5
" Cumulative GPA = 4
" Current disturbance = 0




G = 6.21 (calculated from initial grade distribution)
Commitment Point = 4
Commitment Penalty = -10,000
Hardout Point = -1
Hardout Penalty = -10,000
P5(4, 1) = 0
P5(4, 2) = 0
P5(4, 3) = .2
P5(4, 4)= .6
P5(4, 5) = .2
P5(4, 6) = 0
P5 (4, 7) = 0




Data Computed Previously for Subsequent Semester 6
1001 1001 1001
527.1 527.1 527.1
~ 13.27 13.27 13.27




Table 3 is a xerox from Job 298 and shows precisely how the results
of such calcy.ations appear in the print-out. The location of each
number used in the calculation of d2 (4, 0) and V2(4, 0) is highlighted.
255
Using the matrix V (G, E), the procedure can then be repeated to
2 2obtain d24 (G, c) and V 4 (G, *) and so on... Ultimately the 7 x'3 matrix,
2
V (G, e) is calculated and the process can be repeated for the other
three signal pairs (i = 1, 4).
The entire sequence of value functions {Vt (G, c)} must (by
construction) solve the following functional equation:
Vt(Gt' =MAXUk + (Gt Gk) -PLTY(t) + ; - B (t, G
7
+ 0 I PA(e) I P(Gt, Gt+ 1 )Vt+ (G ,
E Gt~ 
+ + +S t~l'
2
+ 2 1 Pt(G 3 , j + 7 )[Uk + S(Gt - Gk) - PLTY(t + 1) - X.]
j=l J
for i = 1, 4
G = 1, 7
E= -a, o, +a
t = 1, 7
and k = 1, 10
where V1(G , E) = N + .
8 83i
We now use V (G, c), which we have obtained for signal path i, to
compute the expected value--on that path--of drawing a grade and
disturbance in January of. the freshman year. The value of this chance
node is simply
7 2
= [I PA(E) I PDFk(G)VI(G, )} + I PDFk j + 7 )[k-PLTY(1)-x],
G=1 j1
eWhether or not PLTY(t + i) is deducted from the payoffs of
students who are dismissed,(as in the functional equation in the text)
,s controlled by an input parameter IPUN. If IPUN =1, the penalty is
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Transition Cost: - 5.5
v5(4,O) = 6.646
dj(4,O) = 1 Discounted Value of Continuing:
(.2)(-13.27) + (.6)(18.50) + (.2)(18.50) = 12.146
Value of Attriting:
25 + 5(4 - 6.21) - 1,000 + 0 = -986.05
Implied Optimal Decision and Its Value
d?(4, 0) = I








Commitment Point = 4
Commitment Penalty = -1,000
Hardout Point = -1
Hardout Penalty = -10,000
PDFi(1) = .0047
PDF' (2) _ .0094
PDF 1 (3) = .00141
PDF 1 (4) = .0329
PDF1 (5) = .1174
PDF' (6) = .3474
PDF' (7) = .4507
PDF1 (8) = .00470
PDF(9) = .0188










Implied Expected Value of Receiving Initial Grades
V2 = DF1 (G) Vf(G, e) = 23.62651
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This value should be entered in the circle on the left of Chart 14. The
computation can then be repeated for the other signal paths to obtain V1
for i = 1, 4.
Returning to the illustration of Job 298, the information relevant
2
to computing V for quality type one is summarized in Table 4. The
computed value of this chance node is: V2 = 23.62651. These
calculations are reported in the computer output following the period
one decision array for quality type one on path two. Table 5 is a xerox
from Job 298 and shows precisely how such calculations appear in the
print-out.
The computer calculated V2 as .2363E+02, which agrees with our
computations. Similar calculations--for the other signal paths--are
reported after period one is reached for the particular path.
This information is then summarized after the fourth path has been
evaluated for the quality type under the heading "V-Values for
Continuing Beyond BCT." In Job 298, these values are
V1 = .417E+03 V2 = .236E+02 V3 = .417E+03 V4 = .236E+02
Note that in this particular run, V = V3 and V2 = V4
This is a consequence of two input assumptions for Job 298:
* The signal at the LO interview (unlike the BCT signal) was
assumed uninformative--that is, it provided the student with no
information about the psychic reward of an Air Force career.
Hence, &1 = &3 and .2 =4
* Neither signal was regarded as influencing the cost of
transiting from one semester to the next (B (G) was assumed
independent of i; in fact, it was constant independent of the
stage or GPA).
To complete the analysis, the computed V values are
entered at the tips of the decision tree in Chart 15. The reader should
now be able to calculate for this decision tree the value of each of the-
seven decision nodes, the value of each of the three chance nodes, and
Expected Value of Receiving Initial Grades (and Continuing Optimally)
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Commitment Point =4 (attrition after end of sophomore year incurs an obligation)
Commitment Penalty = -1,000
Hardout Point = -1 (there is no hardout policy in effect)
Hardout Penalty = -10,000
Data Calculated Previously for Quality Type 1
V' = 417
V2 = 23.6 Continue to
V3 = 417 1st Grades?
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the optimal decision at each of the seven decision nodes. The answers
are printed in smaller type on Chart 15. These same calculations are
reported in the computer output after the fourth signal path for the
particular quality type. Table 6 is a xerox of the relevant part of the
printout and indicates how these calculations are reported.
The last decision calculated is the first decision the high school
senior will face: whether even to consider the Air Force Academy. If
the expected value of going to the LO interview is lower than the "Value
of the Best Non-AF Career Alternative," the cadet will not pursue the
Academy. Otherwise, he will go to the interview.
This completes the solution to the decision problem of the cadet of
a particular quality type.
B. Selection by the Academy
Our computerized model contains a rudimentary characterization of
the Academy selection process. The user must designate whether the
Academy's goal is--on average--(l) to admit a specified number of
students or, alternatively, (2) to graduate a specified number of
students. The model then solves the foregoing optimization problem for
cadets in the highest ACACOMP group and computes the expected number of
entrants and the expected number of graduates for that group. If the
expected number falls short of the target, the computer repeats the
procedure for the next highest ACACOMP group... As soon as the target
is exceeded, the model selects from the last ACACOM'P group considered
enough students that the expected number of entrants (or, alternatively,
graduates) equals the specified target.*
In fact, the Academy does not select its candidates in this way.
Instead, a complex process is used involving Congressional and
Presidential nominations. Such nominees are often carefully selected
and of high quality; nonetheless, the Academy is occasionally forced to
admit candidates with lower ACACOMP scores' when students with higher
ACACOMP scores are available. To this extent, the actual admissions
process differs from the one we have modeled.
9For further details, see p. .
£NI*ALAS. (,sAt.k AN4AAIIKIVII 'kUaAbILIIS
0.4100E-02 O.9400E-02 O.1410E-02 O.3290E-O1 -O.I14E+00 O.3414E+OC O.4501E+00 O.4700E-04' .SBEO
EXPECTED VALUF OF ENTERING ACADEMICS FOR QUALITY TYPE 1 .PS1(41
" .2363E+02
STAY/LEAVE AFTER ACT DECISION FOR THE FOUR SIGNAL PAIRS
1 0 1 0
V-VALUES FOR CONT INU ItG PAST BCI
0.411E+03 0.236E+02 0.411E+03 0.236E+O2
VALUE OF DROPPING AFTER BCT
o.2500E+02
3PT lNAL DECISIONS/VALUES FOR APPLYING GIVEN 1+1,1-) SIGN ALS
I I
0.338E+03 O.335E+03




VALUE OF BEST NON AF CAREER ALTERNATIVE
C. Z5OE+02
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The existing process does, however, given the Academy some freedom
of action and it is our understanding that this freedom is used to
select applicants with the highest.ACACOMP scores. Hence, "at the
margin," the actual selection process does resemble the one we have
modeled.
As a consequence, the two processes respond in identical ways to
marginal changes in policy. For example, an expansion of the academy
will--under either process--require the Academy to "dig deeper down in
the barrel." As a consequence, the ACACOMP score of the marginal cadet
will fall.
Moreover,-it may be possible to "trick" our submodel of the
selection process into mimicking a given admissions policy.
If, for example, the Academy selects no one from designated ACACOMP
groups, the user can input to the model that there exist no seniors in
such groups. Alternatively, if the Academy is forced to select a
limited number of students (S.) from designated ACACOMP groups the
required number of students in each group can be inputed as belonging to
the three highest ACACOMP groups (but assigned their actual Uk and
PDFk (G)). Our admissions submodel will then give them priority over
candidates who in fact have higher ACACOMP scores.
In short, while the selection process we have modeled differs from
the actual process used by the Academy, it does respond in the same way
to policy changes and, in addition, can often be tricked into mimicking
reality more closely. While developing a more complex submodel of the
selection process might ultimately prove worthwhile, we felt our time
was better spent on other aspects of the problem.
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V. POLICY SIMULATIONS
For a model to be useful, it should capture the essential aspects
of the process under consideration without being so complex that its
behavior in response to policy changes is no more comprehensible than
the process it is intended to illuminate. We believe our model meets
this standard. Below, we review several policy simulations which
illustrate its usefulness.
* Data Inputs
Although we lack the data to estimate many parameters in the model,
we have incorporated available Academy data wherever possible.
Students are divided into the following ten ACACOMP intervals:
Percentage
Quality ACACOMP of High School
Type Interval Seniors
1 3400+ 1
2 3240+ - 3400 1.5
3 3140+ - 3240 2
4 3040+ - 3140 1.5
5 2940+ - 3040 5
6 2840+ - 2940 4
7 2740+ - 2840 4
8 2640+ - 2740 9
9 2540+ - 2640 7
10 0 - 2540 65
The percentage of high-school seniors in each ACACOMP category (the
right-hand column) could not be determined directly since some students
did not take all of the tests aggregated into the ACACOMP score.
Instead, the missing information was "constructed" using prior academic
records (PAR)--a variable highly correlated with ACACOMP.
The GPA intervals were defined as follows:
Grade GPA Interval
1 0 - 1.75
2 1.75+ -2
3 2+ - 2.25
4 2.25+ - 2.45
- 47 -
5 2.45+ - 2.75




Using these definitions and data for the first two years'
performance of the Class of 1985,1 an initial grade distribution
(PDFk G) for k = 1, 10 and G = 1, 9) was estimated for each ACACOMP
group. After a careful review, it was assumed that the stochastic
process governing subsequent transitions of the cumulative GPA did not
differ significantly across ACACOMP categories. Accordingly, a common
sequence of Markov transition matrices (Pt(G, G') for t = 1, 8; G = 1,7;
and G' = 1, 9) was estimated from data on the partial grade histories of
the Class of 1985. While these estimates are rough and could
undoubtedly be refined if more complete data were made available, they
do at least insure that both the grade evolution and the involuntary
attrition of each ACACOMP group in the Class of 1985 are appropriately
represented in the model. These estimated probabilities are hardwired
into the code. Since they are echoed in the output, they will not be
reported here. Most of the other parameters were assigned judgemental
(i.e. arbitrary) values pending estimation of the model (see Section
VI). In general, we tried to simplify the remaining inputs so that the
simulation results would be easier to interpret. Thus, for example, the
disturbance term is set equal to zero, the outside opportunities of
different ACACOMP groups are assumed identical, the LO interview is
assumed not to affect expectations about the value of a career of an Air
Force officer, and so forth. A complete description of the data inputs
is reported in Appendix -; the output of each simulation is available
upon request.
* Illustrative Simulations
1These data were incomplete since they stopped in June of their
sophomore year.
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Policy changes at the Academy may affect (1) who applies; (2) who
is selected; and (3) how those selected behave after entry. The least
complicated policies to analyze have only a single effect; the most
complicated have all three effects. When a policy has multiple effects,
it is useful to distinguish (1) the effects if only the applic'ant pool
had been altered; .(2) the effects if only .the selection of entering
classes had been altered; and (3) the effects if only the voluntary
attrition behavior of the cadets had changed. The aggregate effect is
then approximated by the sum of the three individual effects. For '
simplicity, we begin with policy changes which have a single effect and
then consider more complex cases.
* Academy Expansion
In the late 1960's, the Air Force Academy began to increase the
number of freshmen admitted and soon doubled the size of the student
body. The principal effect of this policy change was to alter the
composition of the entering class.2 To simulate the effects of such a
change, we specify various target numbers of entrants and simulate the
consequences if no other inputs changed. Table 6 reports the results:
Table 7







Doubling the size of the entering class raises the simulated attrition
rate by sixteen percent. Expansion affects attrition behavior (and also
cost and quality of graduates) because it alters the ACACOMP -composition
of the entering Class. In expanding, the Academy admits at the margin
students with lower ACACOMP scores. As illustrated previously in Chart
4, such students have higher attrition rates.
2To a first approximation, the expansion is assumed to reduce
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The hypothesis that attrition at the Air Force Academy was
adversely affected by the substantial expansion which began in the late
nineteen sixties seems to us both plausible and worthy of further
investigation.3 All that is required is data on the attrition rate of
each ACACOMP group (such as that reported in Chart 4) and a detailed
understanding of who would have been selected had the Academy sought to
limit freshman classes to their former sizes. To illustrate, suppose
that if the Academy had not expanded, only the 800 students in the Class
of 1985 with the highest ACACOMP scores would have been admitted. Since
the attrition rate of these students was only 27%, the rate for that
Class would have been 20% lower than was observed. Since some of the
poorer students would presumably have been forced on the Academy by the
actual nomination process, this calculation overstates the adverse
consequences of the expansion. But the actual effects can be more
accurately assessed by using a more refined description of who would
have been selected if class sizes had not increased. An analogous
procedure could be used to determine the effects of the expansion on
cost, quality, and other variables of policy relevance. This
information would permit a clearer distinction between the effects of
the substantial expansion and the effects of other policy changes which
have occurred since the late nineteen sixties.
Changes in the Commitment Point
Since admissions policies affect only the composition of an
entering class rather than the incentives of students, they can be
analyzed using a variety of models besides our own.' Our 'model is
indispensible, however, in predicting the consequences of policies which
alter the Academy environment (the GAO term quoted on the coversheet)
and through it student behavior. Such policies can, in principle,
neither the rewards of being a cadet (B (t,G)) nor the rewards of being
a graduate of the Academy (FT + ()
3 Surprisingly, although it was the sharp increase in attrition at
the Air Force Academy during the early 1970s which prompted the GAO
1eport on the five service academies, this otherwise invaluable analysis
makes no mention of the potential effects of the substantial expansion
there.
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induce changes in 1) the applicant pool, 2) Academy selection, and 3)
cadet behavior. To illustrate, we discuss in this subsection the
simulated effects of moving the commitment point. For simplicity, the
input parameters were set so that no changes in the applicant pool were
induced. Hence only two effects of the policy change are considered in
this subsection: the "behavioral effect" and the "selection effect."
Discussion of the applicant-pool effect will be deferred until the next
subsection.
The selection effect arises because the model was instructed in
each simulation to admit enough applicants to achieve an unchanged
target number of graduates (1000 graduates on average). The selection
effect magnifies the behavioral effect on attrition of any policy
change. If, for example, a policy change would raise the attrition rate
of a given set of cadets, then more cadets would have to be admitted to
maintain the same expected number of graduates. Since the additional
students would have lower ACACOMP scores, admitting them would cause. a
secondary rise in the aggregate attrition rate. Decreases in. the
attrition rate would be magnified in an analogous manner.
Table 7 reports the results of simulations in which the commitment
point was moved in one-semester increments from the entry point (t=0) to
graduation (t=8) and then removed entirely (t=9). As the table reflects,
such policy changes are expected to influence the class size at entry,
the attrition rate, the mean length of spells ending before graduation,
the mean ACACOMP scores of entrants and of graduates, and the cost per
thousand graduates.
The effect of commitment point changes on the attrition rate is
plotted in Chart 16. The attrition rate is lowest (12.44%) when the
commitment obligation is incurred at entry. As the commitment point is
moved further toward graduation, the attrition rate rises sharply and
then falls slightly (to 30.96%). The simulated rate associated with the
current policy of commitment at the 4th marking period is 32.15%.
Ironically, because of the fl-shaped curve, the attrition rate could be
reduced by moving the commitment point in either direction although- -
in the absence of applicant -pool effects -- substantially larger
improvements in attrition, cost, and quality .could be achieved by
requiring commitment at entry.
Table 8
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The attrition paths for individual ACACOMP groups are also
fl-shaped. Two opposing forces account for the shapes of these paths.
To understand these forces, consider the consequences of postponing the
commitment point. The decision nodes in the model can then be
partitioned into three sets: 1)those nodes following the later-
commitment point; 2)those nodes preceding the earlier commitment point;
and 3) those nodes in between. Chart 17 is a representation of these
three sets of nodes. For concreteness, assume the commitment point is
moved from the fourth to the fifth semester. No decision rules would
change from the fifth semester onward since the cadet would at those
points face the same payoffs under either policy. At every decision
node prior to the fourth semester, however, the increased flexibility of
a later service obligation would (weakly) increase the value of
continuing at the Academy while leaving unchanged the payoff to dropping
out. Consequently, the cadet might decide to continue in some
situations where he formerly would have attrited. If this were the only
force at work, it would reduce the attrition rate. However, the
postponement of the commitment point would also mean that a cadet would
no longer incur a service obligation by attriting in the fourth
semester. Consequently, he might decide to attrite at some of those
decision nodes in the fourth semester where he formerly would have
continued--a force tending to increase the attrition rate. One
implication of this analysis is that a marginal postponement of the
commitment point from an initial position at entry must increase the
attrition rate. This follows because there are then no attrition
decisions preceding the earlier commitment point and hence only the
latter force discussed above is present. -.
It has not been established for all parameter values that the
attrition path of an ACACOMP group must be single-peaked or that it must
achieve its minimum when commitment occurs at entry; nonetheless, our
simulations all had these characteristics. In any case, the simulations
do clearly demonstrate that the relationship between the commitment
point and the attrition rate need not be monotonic. Hence, even though
the Coast Guard Academy reportedly experienced some reduction in
attrition when it moved its commitment point from the junior year to










graduation as did West Point when it moved its commitment point to the
senior year, nonetheless larger reductions might have been achieved by
moving these commitment points in the opposite direction."
Besides the attrition rate, movements in the commitment point also
influence other variables of policy relevance. Charts 18 and-19 depict
the simulated effects on the quality of graduates (measured by their
mean ACACOMP score) and the cost of producing them (measured in terms of
man-semesters per thousand graduates). Policy changes which increase
the aggregate attrition rate induce the Academy to admit additional
students. As a result, the mean ACACOMP score of the graduates falls.
The quality path therefore decreases whenever the aggregate attrition
path increases (and vice versa) as Charts 16 and 18 illustrate. Thus,
policies which reduce the aggregate attrition rate simultaneously
improve the quality of graduates.5  In the absence of applicant-pool
effects, commitment at entry not only secures the lowest attrition rate
but also the highest quality graduates.
The cost consequences of changes in the commitment point are
illustrated in Chart 19. Costs are reported in terms of the man-
semesters required per thousand graduates and must therefore equal or
exceed 8000 man-semesters. If costs exceed this benchmark, the
interaction of two factors must be responsible: the magnitude of
attrition and the mean length of spells ending in attrition. Any policy
change which reduces the number of attritees by some percentage but at
the same time increases the mean length of their spells by a larger
percentage will increase costs. Consequently, as a comparison of Charts
"Interview (July 29, .1984) with John D. Pinto, a former instructor
at the Coast Guard Academy and letter (January 19, 1984) from Carlton E.
Bacon, Director of Institutional Research at the USMA. According the
the latter, "During the 1970's we experienced many resignations during
the summer between the sophomore and junior years from cadets who were
not ready to face a commitment to complete USiMA vis-a-vis active duty
enlisted service. Now cadets are more willing to stick with USMA
through the junior year and, based on our data, are graduating instead
of resigning."
sThis improvement is magnified if the policy change happens in
addition to selectively deter voluntary attrition since involuntary
attrition tends to be more specific than voluntary attrition in weeding
out cadets with lower ACACOMP scores.









16 and 19 illustrates, changes in the commitment point which reduce
attrition do not always reduce costs. Nonetheless in our simulations
commitment at entry results in the lowest costs as well as the lowest
attrition and the highest quality graduates.
* Penalizing Early Attrition
The foregoing simulations suggest that--in the absence of applicant-
pool effects--penalizing early attrition may be beneficial from a number
of standpoints. One way to impose such penalties is by moving the
commitment point to entry. Alternative policies exist, however, which
are superior. Suppose, for example, that the commitment point remained
at the fourth marking period but that a penalty of s ize x was imposed
for earlier attrition. The proposed penalty could be a service
obligation the length of which is increasing in x or a monetary penalty
of x dollars. It is treated as a monetary penalty in the discussion
below.
If x is set equal to the monetary equivalent of the current
obligation to serve on active duty in enlisted status, the new policy
will have exactly the same effects as setting the commitment point at
entry. Hence the new policy must be at least as effective. If, on the
other hand, x is set equal to zero, the new policy is equivalent to the
current practice of commitment after the fourth semester. Intermediate
values of x will result in a policy which is less harsh than commitment
at entry but shares many of its attributes.
Chart 20 reports the simulated effect on the dropout rate of
increasing the penalty (x) for early attrition.6-The attrition rate
'The simulations were run by retaining the commitment obligation
from the fourth semester onward but adding a hardout penalty of variable
size (x) for attrition up to and including the third semester.
Simulating the consequences of leaving a "loophole" by ending the
hardout penalty in the second semester instead is also instructive.
The availability of the loophole stimulates attrition in the third
semester as is evident from the drop in the third-semester continuation
rates of each ACACOMP group. The current policy, which contains a two-
year grace period before any attrition penalty is imposed, can be
regarded as a loophole o'f quadruple the size.
SIMULATED EFFECT ON~ COST OF CHANGING CO1METMENT POINT
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falls monotonically from 32.151 (the rate previously associated with a
fourth semester commitment point) to 12.44% (the rate previously
associated with commitment at entry).
A warning sign is also implicit in Chart 20. In those simulations
where the magnitude of the penalty for early attrition was set'too high,
there were not enough applicants to produce the desired number of
graduates. More generally, policies which change the environment of the
Academy may alter the applicant pool. Such "applicant-pool effects" did
not arise in the previous simulations because of the input parameters
chosen.
In general', as the penalty (x) for early attrition is increased,
the maximized value (V) of attending the Academy will fall and those
ACACOMP groups who were previously on the verge of choosing their next
best alternative instead of applying will withdraw from the applicant
pool. 7 These are likely to be precisely the cadets who previously
dropped out as soon as new information, a better job, or a favorable
transfer opportunity came along. The removal of these weakly-attached
cadets is likely to lower the attrition rate since their choice of the
non-Academy alternative prior to entry removes them from the attrition
statistics.
That some cadets enter the Academy with plans to leave soon after
seems evident from survey information in the GAO Report. Chart 21
indicates the responses of first summer dropouts and "continuing"
students to a question about their plans at that early point to
transfer. Assuming an attrition rate at BCT of 6%, these responses
imply that more than 530 of those students indicating that there is "a
very good chance" they will transfer do in fact leave before the end of
the first summer; some of the others may leave subsequently. It would
be extremely difficult for the admissions office at the Academy to
identify these weakly-attached students from the information they
provide on their applications. Nonetheless, even a very modest penalty
for early attrition will remove from the applicant pool those most
That is, they will either not go to the interview or will not
a,pply afterwards when they previously would have. Formally, one or both
of the products DZERO DOE(1) and DZERO DONE(2) change from one to zero.
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For a sufficiently large penalty, however, there is a risk that
high quality students will also cease to apply and the Academy will be
forced to admit lower quality applicants to achieve its target number of
graduates. Chart 22 illustrates how the path in Chart 20 would likely
change in the presence of applicant-pool effects. 8 As the penalty is
increased, the weakly-attached students withdraw from the applicant
pool, reducing the attrition rate. Hence, the applicant-pool effect
would reinforce the behavioral and selection effects considered
previously. Eventually, however, students with high ACACOMP scores
withdraw from the applicant pool and the applicant-pool effect works in
the opposite direction.' Since the attrition rate no longer falls
monotonically as the penalty for early attrition is increased, care must
be exercised in setting the size of the penalty. While a modest penalty
(e.g. $5000) for early attrition is unlikely to deter high quality
applicants who wish not only to enter but also to complete the program
at Academy, consideration of larger penalties should probably be
deferred until the model is estimated.
Once estimated, the model can also be used to evaluate the
quantitative effects of other penalty structures. The GAO Report [1976,
p. 63], for example, proposed an interesting alternative to the two-
step penalty function we have been discussing:
One alternative which could reduce attrition involves
establishing a more gradual buildup of commitment rather than
forcing a decision at the beginning of the second-class year.
This buildup could be accomplished by making academy
attendance a financial obligation which must be repaid if the
student does not complete the program. This system would be
similar to the proposed conversion of Reserve Officer Training.
Corps scholarships to loans for dropouts of that program...
8 Chart 22 is not based on actual simulations.
'The increase in the attrition rate would be discontinuous because
of the assumption that ACACOMP scores vary discretely rather than
continuously. Since any continuous distribution can be approximated in
this way, our simplification is innocuous.













This GAO proposal may be generalized as follows: cadets who
attrite before the commitment point would pay a financial penalty which
starts at a and rises linearly at.rate s per semester; once the
commitment point is reached at semester t, the active duty obligation
would replace this financial penalty. By setting the three pa'rameters
(a9, s, t) appropriately, any of the policies we have so far considered
can be reproduced. Hence, this policy must be at least as good as the
best of them.
Historically, the academies have set a and s at zero and have
varied only t. It seems intuitively clear, however, that setting a
strictly positive a is preferable since such a penalty would induce
weakly-attached applicants to self-select themselves out of the
applicant pool. Similarly, setting a strictly positive s would induce
students whose eventual departure becomes a certainty to attrite sooner
-- thus lowering costs. These changes need not deter desirable
candidates from applying since the commitment point could be postponed
(t increased) in an offsetting way. Once the model is estimated, it can
be used to determine quantitatively the best 10 member of this flexible
class of attrition policies.11
We have focused attention in this section on movements in the
commitment point and alternative policies which penalize attrition. We
have done so because the Academy expressed interest -in this issue. Had
the Academy asked instead about the consequences of some other policy--
such as providing high school seniors more accurate information about
the Academy--we would have constructed essentially the same model but in
this section would have reported on entirely different simulations. We
conclude the section with a reminder: the model is very versatile and--
when estimated--can be used to evaluate quantitatively the consequences
of a wide variety of proposed changes in Academy policy. 12
10We have so far assumed that the Air Force prefers lower to higher
attrition, lower to higher costs, and higher to lower quality graduates.
Unless guidance is provided about "tradeoffs" among these three goals,
however, no policy can be considered "best." Nonetheless, some policies
are clearly superior (technically, "Pareto superior") to others since
they would induce an outcome which is simultaneously an improvement in-
terms of attrition, cost, and quality.
11A trivial change in the code (i.e. in PLTY(t)) would be required before
the model could be used to evaluate this generalization of the GAO proposal.
I2n principle, the model could also be used to forecast the
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policies which each of the various service academies would adopt in the
long run assuming each competes for. the same pool of high school seniors
and pursues its own goals. Rules to restrain such interservice
competition could then be evaluated. This analysis would use the
methodology of "industrial organization" to determine the benefits of
cooperation in industries with a small number of firms.
- 66 -
VI. READYING MODEL FOR THE ESTIMATION
Estimation of this model will not be an easy task, but with
sufficient ingenuity (and appropriate data) it can be accomplished. An
essential preliminary step is to reduce the number of parameters
involved. To accomplish this, parameter estimates should be
incorporated wherever possible from other sources and "inessential"
parameters in the model should be eliminated. Below, we specify how the
number of parameters can be reduced and then outline how the remainder
of them can be estimated.
The initial grade distribution for each ACACOMP group (PDFk (G)) and
the sequence of transition matrices (Pt (G, G')) can be estimated
independently using data on grade histories.
The joint (and hence the derived conditional) probabilities (Pi,
P2' P3 ) that the signal pair at the interview and BCT falls in one of
the four mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories can be obtained
from LO interview reports, BCT evaluations, and psychological tests
administered to incoming cadets.
In our simulation model, the expected reward from graduating
(M + &. for i = 1, 4)--conditional on the four signal pairs--is
computed from eleven more fundamental parameters. These eleven
parameters indicate the value of three possible outcomes subsequent to
graduation (H, L, M) and the eight joint probabilities (and hence the
derived conditional probabilities P through P1 1 ) that
either H or L occurs in conjunction with one of the four signal
pairs.'
To estimate the model, we suggest eliminating these eleven
parameters, and specifying (. (i = 1, 4) directly. This constitutes a
1
net reduction of seven in the number of parameters to be determined.
'For details, see p.
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Furthermore, we suggest that M + F. (i = 1, 4) be estimated
separately using the Gotz-McCall [1984] model on Air Force officer
retention. Their model computes the expected value--both monetary and
subjective--of a career as an Air Force officer and can be applied to
distinct groups of Academy graduates. A group would be distinguished by
classifying of its interview and its BCT experience. This approach
would eliminate five more parameters (N and four ( ) from further
consideration.
Finally, we suggest that the four-parameter probability
distribution of the disturbance term (a, PA(j) for j = 1, 3) be replaced
by a one-param-eter distribution. This will permit the elimination of
three other parameters (and will also permit greater flexibility in
estimation).
To accomplish this, let Pr(e) be the new distribution with a its
one parameter. Assume E(E) = 0 as before. In the final decision period
(t = 7), determine for each G the largest disturbance consistent with
retention by the Academy and denote this borderline number as E (G).
That is,
0 for e > E (G)
dl (G, E) =-
1 for eE (G)
Since E may take on a large (possibly infinite) set of values,
it is no longer practical to print out or store the matrix d1 (G, E).
t
Nor is it necessary. Instead, the seven-component column vector
(E (G)) completely characterizes the optimal decision in each
t
state. Hence, for t = 7 the computer would compute and store el(G).
Analytically, V7 (G, e) is simply:
lik + 8 (Gt - Gk) - PLTY(7) + c if el > 7 (G)
V7 (G, ;) { P ( 7 ,j7)[Uk( + G(G7 -Gk) -PLTY(8) - X.]
if c & y()
Since V (G, c) is no longer small enough to store in its entirety, we
t
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instead extract from it in advance the information we will subsequently
need: the expected value of entering stage 8:
E [V7(G,()] Pr(E > Ey(G)) [U+ 8(G-G) - PLTY(7) + E(cle > c (G))]c77k k .
+ Pr(c) V (G, c).
E4E (G)
Since V7(G, c) is independent of e for E < E7(G) (denote it V7(G)),
the last term in the foregoing sum is simply V7(G) | Pr(E S E7 (G)).
Hence, in general, the proposed modification requires the
calculation of Et(G), Pr(E > Et(G)) and E(E I c > Et (G)) (for t = 1, 7;
i = 1, 4; and G = 1, 7). The 7 x 3 decision matrix is replaced by a
7 x 1 column vector (Ft(G)) indicating the magnitude of the
borderline disturbance and the 7 x 3 value matrix is replaced by a 7 x 1
column vector (E [Vt(G, E)]) for G = 1, 7).2
A disturbance term of this form could also usefully be included at
the two-pre-entry decisions of whether to go to the interview and
whether to apply. In any case, it must be included at the third pre-
entry decision (omitted in the current version of the model) of whether
to enroll if admitted. Otherwise, every student who applied would be
predicted to enroll if accepted. 3 With these minor changes, the
recursion of the model would proceed exactly as in the existing code.
The following parameters remain to be estimated: 0, S, 8, Uk,
rCOM, HO, X., B(t, G) and CST. Of these, the last three seem the
least important and couldprovisionally be set equal to zero if further
reductions in the number of parameters are required. Finally, by
choosing a sample period where no hardout policy is in effect, we can
set rHO to zero. There remain, therefore, k + 4. parameters to be
estimated (oi, S, 0, rCM and U
2 A minor modification must also be made in the calculation of
continuation rates. See footnote.
31n fact, we understand that roughly 80% of admitted students
enroll. The remainder--in this formulation--draw disturbances making
another alternative more attractive.
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These parameters can be estimated by maximum likelihood using our
model. The "sample" would consist of longitudinal records on individual
students. Each record would classify his interview and BCT experience
and would include his cumulative GPA path and the time and manner of
termination (with graduation, academic dismissal, nonacademic dismissal,
or voluntary attrition). Our model could then be used to calculate the
joint probability--conditional on the vector of unknown parameters--
that a sample would behave in the observed way. The parameters would
then be varied to maximize the likelihood function.
The estimation procedure outlined here was developed and
implemented by -Gotz and McCall [1984] for their optimal-stopping model
of Air Force officer retention. The success of their project and the
similarity of their model to ours leads us to believe that our model can
be estimated once the relevant data are secured. After this is
accomplished, the predictions of our model can be assessed and the model
used to predict behavioral responses to policy-induced changes in the
Academy environment.
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APPENDIX TO PART 1
Commitment Obligations by Class
The service obligations of dropouts from various classes (1959 -
present) were as follows:
-- Early classes 1959-1962.
No commitment or obligations. Had to sign statement
promising to complete program.
-- Class 1963
Obligation to serve in active or reserve military status
for 6 years from date of entry to Academy.
Upon resignation transferred to ready reserve in an enlisted
grade.
-- Class 1964 to 1971
If discharged from Academy will be transferred to Air Force
reserve in an enlisted grade to complete total of 6 year
obligation.
-- Classes 1972 to 1979
Discharged in 4th or 3rd class year, no active duty obligation
incurred.
Discharged in 2nd class year, active duty obligation for not
more than 2 years.
Discharged in 1st class year, active duty obligation for not
more than 4 years (classes 72 to 77) or not more than 3 years
(classes of 78 and 79).
Refuse to accept commission upon graduation, obligation of
4 years of active duty.
-- Classes of 80 to 82
Discharged in 4th, 3rd, or 2nd class years, no active duty
obligation incurred.
Discharged in 1st class year or refuse commission upon
graduation, obligation of 3 or 4 years on active duty,
respectively.
-- Classes of 83 and following
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Same rules as used for classes of 78 and 79.
A distinction must be drawn between the self-interested behavior of
(1) students who correctly anticipate from the outset that the Academy
will follow a given policy and (2) students who are surprised subsequent
to entry by an unanticipated change in policy. For example, when the
Class of 1983 entered the Academy, it was assured the commitment point
would be the beginning of the senior year--as it had been for the three
previous classes. However, during the summer before the start of their
junior year, members of that class received the following memo:
AF/IMP
Change in the Air Force Active Duty Service Commitment Policy
(AF/MP Ltr, 15 Dec 80)
USAFA/SUPT
- 1. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve
Affairs and Installations) has approved establishing an active
duty service commitment for cadets at the beginning of their
second class year, effective with the Class of 1983. Second
class cadets who disenroll after the start of academics, either
voluntarily or involuntarily, will be transferred to the reserve
in the appropriate enlisted grade and will normally be called to
active duty in an enlisted status for a period of two years.
Exceptions will be made for humanitarian reasons and those few
cases in which it is not in the best interest of the Air Force
to call a cadet to active duty who is physically disqualified,
unfit, or unsuited for military service in an enlisted status.
2. This letter supersedes AF/MP letter, dated 15 Dec 80,
subject as above, with the exception of paragraphs 2 and 3
therein, which remain in effect.
A similar modification of the estimation procedure (see Section VI)
is required if data from the Class of 1983 is used to estimate the
parameters of the model.
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